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Resume

The article analyzes the process and key milestones of the growing internal political crisis in the Republic of Cyprus during of Archbishop Makarios. The role in this crisis of the multi-vector policy pursued by the first leader of the independent Cypriot state is noted. Attention is drawn to both the isolation of Cyprus during the years of his reign from the West, and the lack of assistance to the Cypriot authorities from the USSR, which relied in its policy towards Cyprus on the resources and influence of the Russian Church.

Key words: politics, society, church, state, archbishop, president, power, conflict, crisis, process.

The collapse of the world's colonial empires in the middle of the twentieth century was the trigger for the restructuring of the global world order. This process coincided with another — the activation of Soviet diplomacy not only on a regional (as in the nineteen-thirties), but also on a global scale. After the collapse of colonialism, the USSR is actively looking for agents of its influence in the face of political elites, social groups and entire states, modifying its approaches in diplomacy as much as possible: in some countries (Egypt) it relies on new forces (conditional socialists), in others (where the influence of the left is insignificant or the left is a marker of the political underground (Greece and Cyprus)) — on the old ones, playing, in particular, on the heritage of the Russian Empire in its policy in the post-Byzantine cultural space. In the latter case, inter-church relations were useful to the USSR.

Greece, especially Cyprus, became the field where the most conservative forces, in particular the church, turned out to be the allies of the USSR and the conductors of Soviet influence. In this regard, even then — in the middle of the twentieth century — we find the first harbingers of future alliances of the Russian Federation with the right-wing political forces of the West (France, Hungary, Austria, etc.).

The relevance of the topic is determined by one of the few cases in history when the head of the Christian church is also the president. The influence of the personality of Archbishop Makarios, his role in the history of Cyprus and the courage of his political steps in the international arena, still attract researchers from all over the world.

In modern historiography, there are a number of works that explore the activities of the head of the Cypriot church as president of the republic. Among them are the works of O. N. Bredikhin [3], N. M. Zhukova [5], A. Tasoulas [12], devoted mainly to the history of the emergence of the “Cyprus issue” and its impact on international relations. Partially, the personality of the archbishop as a church leader was considered in the article by V. Goncharenko [4] and in the diploma work of the student of the Minsk Theological Seminary D. Pogrebenko [8].

The purpose of the article is to characterize the internal political crisis in the Republic of Cyprus and the role of Archbishop Makarios in it, as the head of the Cypriot Orthodox Church.

The Cypriot Orthodox Church has historically been an important participant in economic activity on the island. Church lands tend to be the most fertile and have year-round irrigation. Lands passed to the Church mainly during the period of Turkish domination. The Christian population of the island, persecuted by the Turks, sought protection from the church, which enjoys certain rights and privileges, and officially transferred their land plots into its ownership, continuing to cultivate and harvest them. Peasants paid meager nominal sums for the use of land. Thus, during the period of Turkish rule, vast areas of land were

concentrated in the hands of the church, a significant part of which remains to this day [10, p-5].

It should be noted that, according to the country's constitution, the Cypriot Church still has the exclusive right to dispose of its property in accordance with church canons. Civil authorities have no right to violate these provisions. Church property cannot be confiscated by anyone, including the state. It is not subject to taxation, is not subject to any control by the state. Significant resources concentrated in the hands of the church have allowed and allow it to actively influence all aspects of the life of the country. This was especially evident during the struggle of Cyprus for its independence in the middle of the 20th century.

The Church in Cyprus also plays a significant role in solving the most important issues of public life. According to the country's constitution, registration of betrothals, marriages, divorces, resolving issues of joint and separate residence of spouses, registration of births, deaths, etc. is carried out by the Church. Civil authorities are deprived of the right to resolve these issues bypassing church canons. Marriages and other civil acts that are not registered in the church are considered invalid. This moment leaves an imprint on the life of the entire population of the Greek community [10]. Thus, we can state a certain “merging” of the state and the Church on the island, which the states that sought to strengthen their relations with Cyprus were historically obliged to take into account.

The history of Cyprus has left its mark on the role of the church in solving the problems of the Greek community of the island. For many centuries, Cyprus was under a foreign oppression, the people did not have their own governing bodies. The church was the only stable institution. In addition, despite the difficulties, the Cypriot Church managed to a large extent to retain some of its rights and privileges even during foreign occupation.

Church leaders themselves often led various national movements. In the course of the national liberation movement of the Greeks, the idea of enosis was gradually born, the movement of the Greek Cypriots for the unification of Greece and Cyprus during the period of Turkish and British domination on the island [15, p. 105]. For the Cypriots, this form of the liberation movement was the most acceptable at that time, especially since it made it possible to rely on the support and assistance of the liberated Greece. From the very beginning, the Greek Cypriot struggle for life was led by the Cypriot Orthodox Church.

These facts - the independence of the Church of Cyprus and the availability of significant, by island standards, resources - in different eras played an important role in its participation in diplomatic relations.

In the era under study, as well as at the beginning of the next millennium, the influence and "people's diplomacy" of the USSR were reduced to interaction with relatively limited and closed social groups. In relation to Cyprus, it was the highest clergy, which, due to the fact that the island republic was headed by the head of the Church of Cyprus, became, in fact, its political elite (at least in part).

It is obvious that during the period under study, Archbishop — President of Cyprus Makarios Muskos (1913-1977), due to long-standing ties with the USSR, established thanks to the ROC MP, and probably due to personal political ambitions, could not go to the reunification of the island with continental Greece, which actively participated in Euro-Atlantic structures. These two factors, in our opinion, could not but determine the "latent-pro-Soviet" vector of his policy.

The first leader of independent Cyprus, being in strained relations with Greece, could not ignore the Turkish factor in his domestic and foreign policy. Otherwise, coupled with the movement of the Greeks for reunification with Greece, a similar movement of the Cypriot Turks, supported by official Ankara, would threaten to finally destroy both the fragile peace on the island and the power of Makarios himself (which happened at the end of his reign).

Back in 1950, when Makarios was elected Archbishop of Cyprus, a referendum held on the island showed that more than 95% of Greek Cypriots were in favor of enosis [15, p. 105]. However, up to 1974 and to the present, it has not taken place in any form. The reasons for this, in our opinion, are partly in the nature of Soviet-Cypriot relations.

The actual ignoring of the problem of enosis, hence the determination of Cyprus's place in world politics, by official Nicosia became the trigger of the internal conflict on the island, which led to the catastrophe of 1974 — the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus and the overthrow of the archbishop-president — and was actively used by external players to strengthen their influence on the island.

However, it would be wrong to consider Soviet influence in Cyprus only as a result of the activity of the USSR or the Russian Church. During his leadership of the country, the Archbishop-President himself sought to pursue an independent policy. The Soviet Union played the role of a certain center of power, to which Cyprus could turn only if necessary, but could influence the island's policy not by itself, based on groups of Soviet influence, etc., but only because of Makarios' personal goodwill towards the USSR.

The "secondary" player, who actually acted "by proxy" of the first, was the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which supported Soviet influence on the political elites of Cyprus. In general, we note that this policy failed due to a number of reasons, which we will pay attention to further.

Let's focus on the Cyprus "domestic political agenda" in more detail. During the period under study, political competition in Cyprus was built mainly along three lines of increasing social division. The first and most important element causing controversy was the ethnic factor [14]. This split between Greek Cypriots (82% of the population) and Turkish Cypriots (18% of the population) was actually institutionalized by the British authorities, who encouraged members of both ethnic communities to support the demands and interests of their own ethnic group.

The second disagreement concerned the attitude towards colonialism. In the Greek community, anti-colonialism transformed into a political demand for union or reunification with Greece (enosis) and became the cornerstone of the mobilization efforts of Greek national patriots [2, p. 81]. The approach of individuals and communities to the problem of colonialism was the most acute and divisive political issue.

The third contradiction was related to social problems. In particular, the tasks of the country's development required the seizure of church property for the purpose of subsequent nationalization. However, this did not happen. The Church, represented by its first hierarch, who became president of the country in 1960, ignored the solution of social problems [17, p. 33].

The anti-colonial movement in Cyprus began to gain momentum at the end of the Second World War. A new political organization called the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus (AKEL) proved to be a decisive force in 1941, contributing to the transformation of the conflict into an ideological battle [19, p. 199-221]. This provoked the reaction of the Church of Cyprus and the ruling classes, which led to the development of mass political organizations — both left and right. In 1942, the first system-wide (pan-Cypriot) political party of the right was created - the Cyprus National Party (KEC), which set itself the goal of regaining leadership in the process of enosis and opposing AKEL. The right-wing view of enosis, however, did not have an anti-colonial character, but assumed the character of a moral, anti-communist crusade, which intensified in subsequent years [17, p. 39].

At the initiative of the Synod of the Church of Cyprus, its Highest body, the aforementioned plebiscite on the future of the island was held in 1950, during which 95% of Greek Cypriots voted for the reunification of Cyprus with Greece. In October 1950,

Archbishop Makarios was elected Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus, who automatically became an ethnarch (head of the nation).

In the 1950s, another significant political movement of the Greek Cypriot people was formed in Cyprus - the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) [16]. EOKA turned from a small group into a spontaneous popular movement [16]. On April 1, 1955, EOKA began an armed struggle against Great Britain. In response, the British authorities executed several Greek Cypriots, and in March 1956 Archbishop Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles. In March 1957, the future leader of the island was released from custody, but he was not immediately allowed to return to Cyprus.

The political situation in Greece at this time often changed, until in 1955, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, who headed Greece, formed a new domestic and foreign policy, an important vector of which was integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Cyprus was at the top of the agenda as the most important issue of Greece's national security. Meanwhile, in 1955, the "trilateral conference" on Cyprus, the anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul that took place in the same year, and Western resistance to the inclusion of the Cyprus item on the UN agenda left many Greeks disappointed with Western policy, thereby opening up opportunities for the Greek left to advocate a policy of non-alignment.

On August 16, 1960, Cyprus became an independent state and a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and Archbishop Makarios was elected the first president of a new sovereign country — the Republic of Cyprus.

The Government of the republic was faced with the task of unification with Greece: "I will not stop fighting for a moment until an alliance with Greece is achieved," [22, p. 90] — the archbishop emphasized. The idea of national identity somehow sounded in each of his sermons.

At the same time, to strengthen the position of the church and protect its interests, Makarios used all his opportunities as head of state, even to the detriment of development tasks. In June 1968, for example, the Parliament raised the issue of distributing surplus church lands among the poor rural population for appropriate compensation. The President took a negative position, and the issue was thus removed.

It is important to note here that the official clericalism of state policy did not interfere with good relations between Cyprus and the USSR. Thus, in one of the letters to Archbishop Dorotheus of Greece, Patriarch of Moscow Alexy notes: "The Cyprus Apostolic Church is dear to the Russian Church through the kinship ties of Orthodoxy, and therefore the children of the Cypriot Church are close to us in spirit... The present cruel torments of its inhabitants must be stopped at the behest of the Christian law of love for one's neighbor and by virtue of the humane civilization of our time. The centuries-old violation of the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriot people must be stopped... The Greek Cypriot people are ripe for freedom and independent expression of will" [6, p. 3-4]. In 1964, a landmark event took place — the USSR-Cyprus Friendship Society was organized.

In the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR during these years, in particular, the following was noted: "The work carried out by the delegation contributed to solving the tasks of improving relations between the USSR and Cyprus ... The stay of the delegation made the USSR Embassy establish useful contacts with the Church of Cyprus ... Maintain regular contacts with the Church of Cyprus ... Invite students to the MDA from Cyprus, and Bishop Gennady of Paphos" [11].

A vivid episode in Soviet-Cypriot relations took place in the mid-1960s: "Your Excellency is already aware of the developments in Cyprus that followed the aggression by Turkey ... I ask Your Excellency for your Intervention in order to stop this inhuman and cruel attack on the Cypriot people" [13, p. 55], — in 1964 Archbishop Makarios addresses the

Soviet leader N.S. Khrushchev about the Turkish-Cypriot conflict. But Archbishop's request remained unanswered — the USSR did not assist the island's government. The escalation on the island was stopped by the United States, although, we emphasize, this did not destroy the multi-vector nature of the policy of the president-archbishop.

Nevertheless, some vectors of Cyprus' policy have gradually changed. After the internal political crisis of 1967, the rejection of the official line on enosis and the orientation towards the preservation of an independent Cypriot state caused serious disagreements in the synod of the Church of Cyprus. In their attacks on Archbishop Makarios, the metropolitans used the slogans of enosis, appealed to the national feelings of the Greeks, referring to the traditions of the struggle for reunification with Greece and accused Makarios of departing from this line.

The Archbishop in this matter could not ignore the position of Turkey, which made the issue of self-determination of Cyprus dependent on the equality of its ethnic communities [7, pp. 240-253]. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the Greek and Turkish communities, including resorting to military assistance to Greece and Turkey patronizing them, gradually led to conflict [1, pp. 43-61]. A striking episode of this period was the Greek-Turkish intercommunal clashes, which led to the bombing of Greek nationalist bases by Turkish aircraft.

The Metropolitans of the Church of Cyprus opposed the government's policy on a number of issues. They have repeatedly stated that in order to preserve cultural identity, it is necessary to have a government and parliament that are focused on Greece.

The hostility of the metropolitans to the archbishop because of his cautious attitude towards "enosis" resulted in a confrontation, when in fact they became the leaders of the anti-government opposition. They openly attacked the president's policies, called on the people to speak out against the government; claimed that those who "now rule Cyprus" are not Greeks. The position taken by the leadership of the church led to the undermining of the unity of the country. In particular, the name of Metropolitan of Kition Anfimos, a member of synod of Cyprus church, was associated with the activities of the illegal "National Front", whose members attacked state institutions, police stations, carried out terrorist acts, blackmailed the population. Some members of this organization were also involved in the assassination attempts on President Makarios in March 1970.

Already during this period, the reactionary elite of the church spoke in favor of Makarios' resignation from the post of president. At a meeting of the synod on May 28-30, 1970, the secretary of the Metropolitan of Cyrenaia Cyprian, a member of synod, one of the enemies of Makarios, said that he should be either archbishop or president, but not both at the same time [10, p. 10].

Under these conditions, Archbishop Makarios was forced to make some concessions. At each meeting of the synod, he reported on the progress of resolving the issue of enosis, sought to convince the metropolitans that it is currently impossible to achieve enosis without a war with Turkey, therefore it is necessary to look for solutions within the Cyprus negotiations. During the meeting of the Synod in May 1970 Archbishop Makarios, under pressure from the metropolitans, agreed to create an Advisory Council at the synod to resolve the Cyprus issue, which would include all members of the synod, as well as "nationally minded" political figures, including the opposition [10, p. 8].

Archbishop Makarios asked to postpone the discussion of details related to enosis until the next meeting of the synod. The Synod's decision to create an Advisory Council caused a wave of outrage in society. Most political leaders opposed this decision and stated that such a measure would make the synod an organization standing above the government, parliament and political parties. They stressed that this is another attempt of the Synod to interfere in the solution of a political issue. It was also pointed out that the establishment of a council that

intends to pursue a different policy on the Cyprus issue from that of the Government would introduce additional difficulties in domestic policy. Taking into account the negative reaction of the absolute majority of political figures and the population of the country, once again the synod postponed the creation of the council.

The "anti-Macarian" activity of the metropolitans has received the support of many politicians. In early April 1970, the leader of the right—wing opposition, General Georgios Grivas, demanded the removal of Archbishop Makarios from power.

At the end of 1971, due to the complicated situation in the country caused by the activation of anti-government opposition forces, the interference of the church elite in the political life of the country noticeably intensified.

The aggravation of the situation, which intensified by the end of 1971, turned into a political crisis in February–March 1972, which was one of the most dangerous for the entire existence of the republic. Western circles have taken a course to either force the archbishop to submit, or to remove him from power by force through a coup d'etat. They activated a campaign to undermine his authority and to fight him inside the country, a united front of the local opposition, the church leadership and illegal organizations, which by that time was headed by the aforementioned General Grivas. The role of the main executor of NATO's plans was assigned to Greece, which used its capabilities by resorting to open interference in the affairs of the island.

On February 11, the Greek government presented an ultimatum to the archbishop, demanding the transfer of weapons brought to the island under UN control, the reorganization of the government, the purges of the state apparatus and recognition of the dominant role of Athens in resolving the Cyprus issue. There is a crisis situation on the island.

The demand of the metropolitans caused a contradictory response in society. On March 3, a demonstration in defense of the President took place in Nicosia. The President received a large number of telegrams with support from various organizations of the country. All this gave Makarios the moral right and the basis in his message of March 19 to reject the demands of the synod members, and on June 10 he declared that he would not resign as president and would continue his work until 1977. At the same time, Turkey tried in every possible way to divide the island and did everything possible to achieve this goal.

Due to the multi-vector policy pursued, without receiving support from either the United States or the USSR, Cyprus was isolated politically and militarily. The President of the Republic has also become a de facto "persona non grata" for the United States as a result of his policy of non-alignment.

The agents of Athens, who suffered a complete political defeat in Cyprus, decided to act through the hierarchs of the Church of Cyprus. Metropolitans Anthimos of Chania, Kyprianos of Kyrenia and Gennady of Paphos [18, p. 221], who considered Makarios a secret ally of communism, gathered in early 1973 as the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. They stated that the performance of the duties of the Ethnarch and the President is incompatible with the Archiepiscopal ministry, because it contradicts the tradition and canons of the church, demanding Makarios to give up the post of President.

On April 13, 1973, the Synod announced the deposition of Makarios. Metropolitan Gennady of Paphos was appointed locum tenens of the Archiepiscopal see. General Grivas, on behalf of EOKA, announced his patronage to the Synod and took the rebellious metropolitans under his protection. A wave of demonstrations in support of Makarios took place all over Cyprus. In addition, statements by local Orthodox churches, including the Russian One, followed in support of the archbishop.

In Paphos, the archbishop made a statement on the air from a local radio station: "The Greek people of Cyprus! The putschists decided to destroy Cyprus, divide it. Resist them in

any way. Don't be afraid. Demonstrate your will and your determination to fight. Join forces loyal to the State. The junta must not pass... And the struggle that the Greek Cypriot people are now waging is a holy struggle and victory will be ours. Long live freedom!" [20, Σ. 271].

On July 19, Archbishop Makarios addressed the UN Security Council: "I have come here to seek the support of the International Community in our struggle to preserve the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus... If the United Nations does nothing to convince Turkey to respect its resolutions, the faith of small States in the UN will be seriously undermined" [22, p. 80].

At the same time, in Cyprus, the conspirators announced that they had overthrown Makarios and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, one of the leaders of EOKA, leader of the partisan war for Cyprus independence. Under these conditions, Turkey has the opportunity to achieve a long—standing intention - the division of Cyprus [9, pp. 42-53]. Despite the country's membership in NATO, it was not satisfied with the growth of Western influence on the island [23, p. 219].

On July 20, 1974, Turkish expeditionary forces landed on the coast of Cyprus in the area of Kyrenia. The troops began to advance along the coast, occupying Turkish enclaves. Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard, with few exceptions, deserted. The invaders moved quickly, meeting almost no resistance, occupying part of the island. They forcibly evicted the Greek population from the homes where generations of their ancestors had lived. This is how the exclusively Turkish zone in Cyprus was formed. The island was divided.

The Archbishop returned to Cyprus on December 7, 1974 . He was met with thousands of demonstrations [21, p. 34]. He soon resumed the presidency, ruling the Greek southern part of the island until his death on August 3, 1977. The President relied on a broad coalition of both right and left forces in Cyprus.

In general, summing up the above, we note the following:

1. For various reasons, which we can only assume (the desire to preserve personal power, personal sympathies, the international situation, etc.), Archbishop-President Makarios, during his leadership of the Republic of Cyprus, sought to pursue a multi—vector policy, balancing between various centers of power in the region, both global - the USSR and the West, and regional — Greece and Turkey.

2. During the years of his rule, Cyprus refrained from actively participating in Euro—Atlantic structures, and at the same time could not establish closer relations with the USSR in comparison with the existing ones - due to geographical remoteness of ideological differences, possible image losses, etc.

3. This policy led in the medium term to the growth of internal contradictions in the republic, which were fueled by some external forces (the West, Greece, Turkey), while other diplomatic counterparts of Cyprus (the USSR) could not or did not want to assist the country in solving its internal problems. The most important factor in the internal political explosion in the country was its bi-ethnicity.

4. The uniqueness of the internal political situation in Cyprus in the era under study lies in the fact that the right-wing institutions, and in particular the church, became the conductor of the Soviet, in other words, obviously "left" influence. The Soviet Union, for its part, used the ROC as a conduit for this influence.

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